Ex parte Underwood and Miles, [Ms. SC-2024-0263, June 27, 2025] __ So. 3d __ (Ala. 2025). In a per curiam decision, the Court (Stewart, C.J., and Bryan, McCool, and Lewis, JJ., concur; Cook, J., concurs specially; Shaw, J., concurs in the result; Wise, Sellers, and Mendheim, JJ, concur in the result) issues a writ of mandamus directing the Walker Circuit Court to dismiss on grounds of State executive officer immunity claims for damages against former Walker County Sheriff and deputy Braden Miles. On April 14, 2017, Deputy Sheriff Miles attempted to apprehend the driver of a stolen motorcycle. During the ensuing high-speed chase, the motorcyclist crashed head-on into John Long, a motorist traveling in the opposite direction on Alabama Highway 195. Plaintiff Long “alleged that Deputy Miles had negligently pursued the fleeing motorcyclist and that former Sheriff Underwood had negligently failed to implement policies, procedures, and training related to high-speed pursuits.” Ms. *2.
The Court concludes “the claims against former Sheriff Underwood must be dismissed because, as a former executive officer of the State, he is entitled to immunity from liability for damages for acts performed within the line and scope of his duties. Moreover, because our precedent requires us to extend the same immunity to deputy sheriffs, Long’s claims against Deputy Miles must likewise be dismissed.” Ms. *3.
The Court explains, “Alabama decisions acknowledging that sheriffs are immune from individual-capacity damages suits based on acts taken within the line and scope of their duties … reflect both (1) the separation-of-powers doctrine embodied in §§ 42(b) and 42(c) and (2) ‘the unique constitutional status of sheriffs as executive officers.’ Suttles v. Roy, 75 So. 3d 90, 95 (Ala. 2010).” Ms. **9-10. In support of its conclusion, the Court emphasizes that “Long alleges only that former Sheriff Underwood was negligent in the performance of his official duties.” Ms. *10.
The Court reiterates “deputies – like sheriffs – are entitled to immunity from individual-capacity claims for damages ‘whenever the acts that form the basis of the[ir] alleged liability were being performed within the line and scope of the[ir] … employment.’ Ex parte Donaldson, 80 So. 3d 895, 899 (Ala. 2011).” Ms. **10-11. The Court also notes that Long “did not ask this Court to reconsider the applicability of the principle that a sheriff’s deputy is the alter ego of the sheriff for the purposes of immunity.” Ms. *12, n. 3.
In his special concurrence, Justice Cook invites parties in future cases to raise the impact on alter-ego immunity of deputy sheriffs of § 36-22-3(b) Ala. Code 1975. Ms. **14-22. This statute enacted in 2011 provides:
“Any of the duties of the sheriff set out in subsection (a) or as otherwise provided by law may be carried out by deputies, reserve deputies, and persons employed as authorized in Section 14-6-1[, Ala. Code 1975,] as determined appropriate by the sheriff in accordance with state law. Persons undertaking such duties for and under the direction and supervision of the sheriff shall be entitled to the same immunities and legal protections granted to the sheriff under the general laws and the Constitution of Alabama …, as long as he or she is acting within the line and scope of his or her duties and is acting in compliance with the law.” (emphasis added).