Denial of Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment

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Lewis v. Ojano-Bracco, et al., [Ms. SC-2024-0534, May 9, 2025] __ So. 3d __ (Ala. 2025). The Court (Mitchell, J.; Stewart, C.J., and Wise, Sellers, and McCool, JJ., concur) affirms the Jefferson Circuit Court’s order denying Bradley Lewis’s motion for relief from a default judgment in a fraud action.

Lewis filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., arguing he was properly served. Ms. **1-2. The Court explains under Rule 4(c)(1), “service of process is valid if performed ‘at the individual’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein.’” Ms. *5.

The Court concludes that the address where the summons and complaint was personally delivered to Lewis’s stepson was Lewis’s usual place of abode. “Courts look to the facts of each case to determine a party’s ‘usual place of abode.’” Ms. *5, citing Allsopp v. Bolding, 86 So. 3d 952, 962 (Ala. 2011). The Court favorably cites cases from other jurisdictions holding that, for purposes of service, a spouse’s marital home is presumed to be his usual place of abode. Ms. *6. The Court also notes that Lewis (1) testified that the address was his “address on record”; (2) listed that address on various tax returns, a bankruptcy filing, and on filings with that Alabama Secretary of State; and (3) had accepted service at that address in an unrelated suit. Ms. *6. The Court finds that Lewis’s adult stepson resided at the address and could accept service. Ms. *8. The stepson’s sworn interrogatory responses, application for certificate of title, and prior acceptance of service for Lewis were sufficient evidence of his residence. Ms. *9.

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