Flickinger v. King, et al., [Ms. SC-2024-0153, May 9, 2025] __ So. 3d __ (Ala. 2025). The Court (McCool, J.; Stewart, C.J., and Wise, Sellers, and Mitchell, JJ., concur) affirms in part and reverses in part a summary judgment issued by the Jefferson Circuit Court in favor of Lawrence Tracy King and the law firm of King Simmons Ford & Spree, P.C. (“the King law firm”) dismissing Daniel Flickinger’s claim for tortious interference with a business relationship. In a prior appeal, the Court affirmed dismissal of Flickinger’s claims for defamation and invasion of privacy.
Flickinger alleges that he was fired from his job as a litigator at Wainwright, Pope & McMeekin, P.C. (“WPM”) as a result of a social media post about George Floyd. Flickinger alleges that the Defendants made false statements to WPM regarding Flickinger’s George Floyd post that precipitated his termination.
Noting that it “may affirm the circuit court’s judgment on any valid legal ground, Murey v. City of Chickasaw, 385 So. 3d 903, 912 (Ala. 2023),” Ms. *17, the Court affirms the summary judgment as to the King law firm because Lawrence King’s actions regarding Flickinger and the George Floyd post were not done in the line and scope of his employment with the King law firm. The Court reiterates
“‘An act is within an employee’s scope of employment if the act is done as part of the duties the employee was hired to perform or if the act confers a benefit on his employer.’” Cobbs, Allen & Hall, Inc. v. EPIC Holdings, Inc., 335 So. 3d 1115, 1139 (Ala. 2021) (quoting Hulbert v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 723 So. 2d 22, 23 (Ala. 1998)) (emphasis omitted). An employee’s act is not within the line and scope of his employment, however, “when the employee acts on wholly personal motives that would not ‘reasonably further’ the employer’s business.” East Alabama Behav. Med., P.C. v. Chancey, 883 So. 2d 162, 168 (Ala. 2003) (citation omitted)).
Ms. *18.
As to the claim against Lawrence King individually, the Court rejects Flickinger’s argument “that proximate cause is not a relevant question in a tortious-interference case. See Rondini v. Bunn, 338 So. 3d 749, 753 (Ala. 2021) (noting that the concept of proximate cause applies to intentional torts, though it is treated differently than it is treated in negligence cases).” Ms. *24. However, in reversing the summary judgment based upon lack of causation, the Court explains
[A] defendant’s acts may subject him to liability for an intentional tort if the acts “‘were substantial factors in bringing about the harm,’” (citation omitted), and “even very remote causation” may be a basis for imposing liability in such cases. Viewed in a light most favorable to Flickinger, the evidence provides a basis upon which a jury could find that King’s act of sending the George Floyd post to Wainwright was one of the “substantial factors” – if not the primary factor – “in bringing about” the WPM partners’ decision to terminate Flickinger’s employment.”
Ms. *29, quoting Shades Ridge Holding Co. v. Cobbs, Allen & Hall Mortgage Co., 390 So. 2d 601, 609-10 (Ala. 1980) (internal citation omitted).
Finally, the Court holds that King’s justification defense did not support the summary judgment because “whether King was justified in sending the George Floyd post to Wainwright is to be evaluated in light of the factors set forth in § 767 of the Restatement, and, the evaluation of those factors ‘is generally a question to be resolved by the trier of fact.’” Ms. **34-35, quoting Cobbs, Allen & Hall, Inc. v. EPIC Holdings, Inc., 335 So. 3d 1115, 1131 (Ala. 2021) (some internal quotation marks omitted).