Ex parte DuPont De Nemours, Inc., et al. and Ex parte INV Performance Surfaces, LLC, [Ms. SC-2024-0514 and SC-2024-0515, Apr. 4, 2025] __ So. 3d __ (Ala. 2025). The Court (Mendheim, J.; Stewart, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Mitchell, and McCool, JJ., concur; Cook, J., recuses) issues writs of mandamus, holding that (1) the claims brought by the Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Gadsden (“Gadsden Water”) against PFAS manufacturers were time-barred, and (2) the Etowah Circuit Court lacked personal jurisdiction over INV Performance Surfaces, LLC (“INV”), a supplier of carpet fiber.
The Court concludes that Gadsden Water’s claims against DuPont and Daikin were barred by both the two-year and six-year statutes of limitations because its first legal injury from PFAS contamination occurred no later than September 2016, when Gadsden Water initiated a nearly identical action (Gadsden I) and alleged it had found PFAS levels exceeding EPA health limits in its water supply at that time. Ms. **31-32.
The Court rejects Gadsden Water’s argument that a 2022 EPA health advisory constituted a new injury and that DuPont and Daikin’s later production of “short-chain” PFAS restarted the limitations period. It also rejects Gadsden Water’s assertion of a continuing tort, explaining that continuing consequences do not toll limitations periods absent allegations of ongoing tortious conduct. Ms. **45-49, citing Ex parte Abbott Labs, 342 So. 3d 186, 195-96 (Ala. 2021).
The Court holds that the circuit court lacked specific personal jurisdiction because INV’s alleged acts of supplying PFAS-containing products to Georgia carpet mills would not support jurisdiction in Alabama. INV neither discharged PFAS into Alabama nor directed pollution toward the state; mere knowledge that its products might end up downstream was insufficient to establish purposeful availment. Ms. **54-65, citing Ex parte Aladdin Mfg. Corp., 305 So. 3d 214, 238 (Ala. 2019); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014). The Court reiterates that personal jurisdiction cannot be based solely on a defendant’s general market awareness or the unilateral actions of third parties. Ms. **64-65.