Joseph v. Caritas of Birmingham, No. SC-2025-0389, 2026 WL 1262203 (Ala. 2026). The Court (Wise, J.; Stewart, C.J., and Mendheim, Cook, McCool, and Parker, JJ., concur; Shaw, J., dissents; Sellers, J., dissents, with opinion) reverses the Shelby Circuit Court’s order granting summary judgment and remands for further proceedings, holding that when the evidence supports a reasonable inference that lighting conditions were partial or poor, rather than total darkness, the openness and obviousness of a premises hazard is generally a jury question. *11-12.
This dispute arose after Caritas hosted a wedding reception at its facility and hired a catering company for the event. *1. Caritas hired Joseph, who operates catering business, to service the reception and paid her for her work. Id. At the end of the event, a Caritas representative directed Joseph to exit through a door near a loading dock but did not warn her about the loading dock. *2. When Joseph stepped outside, the area was dark and had no exterior lighting. Id. After taking only a few steps, Joseph fell from the loading dock and sustained injuries. Id. *1-2. Joseph filed suit in the Shelby County Circuit Court, alleging negligence, wantonness, and negligent or wanton hiring, training, and supervision. *2. The court entered summary judgment in favor of Caritas. Id.
On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to her negligence claim. *3. The Court agrees, holding first that plaintiff was a business invitee on defendant’s premises because defendant materially benefitted from plaintiff’s presence on its premises. *4.
The Court distinguishes Owens v. National Security of Alabama, Inc., 454 So. 2d 1387 (Ala. 1984) and Ex parte Industrial Distribution Services Warehouse, Inc., 709 So. 2d 16 (Ala. 1997), explaining that those cases involve total darkness, which may constitute an open and obvious danger to someone proceeding through unfamiliar surroundings as a matter of law. *11. Relying on Ex parte Kraatz, 775 So. 2d 801, 804 (Ala. 2000), the Court explains that partial or poor lighting may mislead a reasonably prudent person into thinking that she can see and avoid hazards, making openness and obviousness a question for the jury. *11.
The Court holds that, because Plaintiff showed substantial evidence to create a question of fact as to the level of light on defendant’s premises at the time of her fall, there was a question of fact as to the openness and obviousness of the danger, and thus the trial court erred in entering summary judgment. *11. The Court reverses the trial court’s summary judgment and remands for further proceedings. *12.