Applying §§ 25-5-52 and 25-5-53, Ala. Code 1975, the Court reiterates that the Act provides the exclusive remedy for covered workplace injuries and that acceptance of benefits constitutes an election that estops the employee from pursuing other remedies. Ms. **5–6 (citing Davis v. M.C. Dixon Lumber Co., 551 So.2d 305, 306 (Ala. 1989)). The employer meets its summary-judgment burden by presenting evidence that the employee received medical and indemnity benefits under the Act, which shifts the burden to the employee to present substantial evidence that the Act does not apply. Ms. **6–7.
The Court rejects the argument that the injury falls outside the Act because the employee was allegedly off duty at the time of the accident, explaining that an employee cannot accept workers’ compensation benefits and simultaneously pursue tort remedies based on an inconsistent theory. Ms. **7–8 (citing Brown v. Hixon, 686 So. 2d. 1220,1222 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996)). Because the employee fails to present substantial evidence that the Act does not apply, the Court holds that the tort claims against the employer are barred. Ms. *8.
As to the co-employee claim, the Court reiterates that § 25-5-11 permits recovery only for “willful conduct,” defined as an intent or design to injure with a heavy evidentiary burden. Ms. **9–10 (citing Reed v. Brunson, 527 So. 2d 102 (Ala. 1988)). At the summary-judgment stage, the plaintiff must present substantial evidence showing either a motive to injure or that injury was substantially certain to result. Ms. **9–10. Because the employee presents no evidence of willful conduct—and relies only on allegations—the claim fails as a matter of law. Ms. **10–11.