Ex parte Steven M. Taylor, M.D., [Ms. SC-2025-0164, Nov. 7, 2025] __ So. 3d __ (Ala. 2025). In a unanimous decision, the Court (Mendheim, J.; Stewart, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Cook, and McCool, JJ., concur) issues a writ of mandamus to the Shelby Circuit Court directing the court to grant Steven M. Taylor, M.D.’s motion to strike Sandra Phillips’s first amended complaint in a medical-malpractice action against him.
While acknowledging that mandamus is a drastic remedy, the Court also notes that § 6-5-551 places a duty on the plaintiff in an AMLA action to “‘amend his complaint timely upon ascertainment of new or different acts or omissions [than those alleged in the complaint] upon which his claim is based.’” Ms. *48. The Court explains the interplay between Rule 15(a) and § 6-5-551as follows:
Rule 15(a) must be read in harmony with the requirements of § 6-5-551, not in a manner that would pit that Rule against the legislature’s clear directives. See Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-552. While this Court has stated that amendments pursuant to Rule 15(a) are to be freely allowed when made more than 42 days before the first trial setting, such amendments may be disallowed by the court on its own motion or upon a motion to strike by an adverse party, where appropriate. See Ex parte GRE Ins. Grp., 822 So. 2d at 390. Valid grounds for refusing to allow such an amendment include actual prejudice and undue delay. Id. In the present case, we consider the latter as it relates to the duties of a plaintiff and the rights of a defendant under § 6-5-551, as described above.
In addressing the issue of undue delay in relation to § 6-5-551, we wish to be clear. The issue is fact-specific. We are not addressing the issue whether Phillips could have amended her complaint in the manner she ultimately did if she had filed that amendment at the time of the original summary-judgment proceedings or even following the taking of Dr. Taylor’s deposition; those circumstances are not at issue, and we will express no opinion on them. We are addressing whether, after Phillips repeatedly failed to amend her complaint when she had adequate information to do so in response to Dr. Taylor’s insistence that she comply with § 6-5-551, the circuit court exceeded its discretion by allowing her to amend her complaint (denying Dr. Taylor’s motion to strike) in November 2024.
Ms. **49-50.
The Court issues the writ “[b]ecause the materials before us clearly establish ‘[t]ruly inordinate and unexplained delay’ by Phillips regarding the filing of her first amended complaint, i.e., undue delay for purposes of Rule 15(a), especially in light of Dr. Taylor’s timely and repeated assertion of the requirements of § 6-5-551, we conclude that the circuit court exceeded its discretion by denying Dr. Taylor’s motion to strike.” Ms. *53.