Southampton 100, LLC v. Alabama Department of Revenue, [Ms. SC-2025-0227, Nov. 26, 2025] __ So. 3d __ (Ala. 2025). The Court (Cook, J.; Stewart, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, and Sellers, J., concur; Cook, J., concurs specially, with opinion) reverses the Jefferson Circuit Court’s order dismissing an action involving a dispute over ad valorem tax assessments. Dismissal was ordered as a sanction for the Plaintiff Southampton 100, LLC’s (“Southampton”) failure to make a witness available in Birmingham for a 30(b)(6) deposition.
The Court reiterates
“‘The choice of discovery sanctions is within the trial court’s discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent gross abuse of discretion, Johnson v. Langley, 495 So. 2d 1061 (Ala. 1986); Deaton, Inc. v. Burroughs, 456 So. 2d 771 (Ala. 1984); Weatherly v. Baptist Medical Center, 392 So. 2d 832 (Ala. 1981), and then only upon a showing that such abuse of discretion resulted in substantial harm to appellant. Edward Leasing Corp. v. Uhlig & Associates, Inc., 785 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1986).’” Daily v. Esser, 391 So. 3d 268, 287-88 (Ala. 2023) (quoting Iverson v. Xpert Tune, Inc., 553 So. 2d 82, 87 (Ala. 1989)).
Ms. *14. The Court explains a party’s obligation to respond to a 30(b)(6) deposition notice:
Once a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice has been duly served, it is the obligation of the responding party to take any necessary action to identify its corporate representative and to make him or her available for a deposition. See Ex parte Hankook Tire Am. Corp., 400 So. 3d 585, 591 (Ala. 2023) (explaining that the trial court may sanction the responding party when the designated corporate representative fails to appear for a properly noticed deposition). If the deposition notice is objectionable or is otherwise impractical (for instance, if the witness or counsel has scheduling conflicts), the responding party should promptly raise those concerns with opposing counsel and attempt to negotiate a resolution… If a resolution cannot be reached, it is the responsibility of the party to whom a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition has been served to file a motion for a protective order – normally before the date of the deposition.
Ms. **17.
In reversing the dismissal , the Court emphasizes that “[d]ismissal of an action with prejudice is a drastic sanction that should be imposed only when a party has acted with ‘willful and deliberate disregard’ for reasonable and necessary discovery requests. Iverson, 553 So. 2d at 87. Because the record indicates that Southampton made an effort to make Majer available to ADOR for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, provided one other corporate representative, and was confronted with an ambiguous procedural situation, it did not ‘willfully’ attempt to prevent discovery.” Ms. *30.