Dates v. City of Atlanta, [Ms. S24G1246, June 10, 2025] __ Ga. __ (2025). The Court (McMillian, J.; Peterson, C.J., Warren, P.J., Bethel, Ellington, LaGrua, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ., concur) held that the minor tolling provision under OCGA § 9-3-90(b) does not apply to the municipal ante litem notice requirement in OCGA § 36-33-5. The Court explained that the ante litem statute imposes a strict six-month deadline to notify a municipality of a claim, and nothing in the text suggests it is subject to tolling. In contrast, the county ante litem statute (OCGA § 36-11-1) explicitly provides a tolling provision for minors. Because the legislature included tolling language in one statute but not the other, the Court concluded the omission in the municipal statute was intentional. See Ms. **6–8.
The Court also reaffirmed that ante litem notice requirements are not statutes of limitations, but rather conditions precedent to filing suit, and therefore are not subject to statutory tolling provisions designed to extend limitation periods. Citing Ragsdale v. Dept. of Public Safety, 308 Ga. 210 (2020), and City of Chamblee v. Maxwell, 264 Ga. 635 (1994), the Court emphasized that OCGA § 9-3-90(b)’s reference to the time for “bringing an action” does not encompass notice requirements that merely determine when a court can “entertain” an action. As such, a supplemental notice filed outside the six-month period, even on behalf of a minor, is untimely and cannot be revived by tolling. Ms. **9–12.