The New York Times Company v. Kai Spears, No. SC-2025-0370, 2026 WL 972382 (Ala. April. 10, 2026). The Court (Stewart, C.J., and Wise, Bryan, Cook, and Parker, JJ., concur; Shaw, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result, with opinion, which Sellers, J., joins; Mendheim, J., dissents, with opinion) answers certified questions from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama arising from a defamation action filed by Kai Spears against The New York Times. The dispute centers on the scope of Alabama’s reporter “shield statute,” § 12-21-142, Ala. Code 1975, and what information the statute protects from disclosure. *2.
The Court declines to answer the first certified question concerning whether information published online by a corporation that also publishes a newspaper is protected under the statute. *2. Because the allegedly defamatory information was later republished in the newspaper itself, Spears concedes that the statute applied under the facts of this case, rendering the issue non-determinative of the underlying federal action. *2-3.
Although the parties agree that the identity of Source A – who told the Times reporter that Spears was the unidentified passenger in Miller’s car – is protected, they dispute whether the identity of Source B, who separately told the reporter only that “someone with Alabama was in the car,” is likewise protected, because the parties disagree over whether information that merely corroborates already-published information was itself “published in the newspaper” within the meaning of the statute. *3. The Court declines to resolve that separate dispute, explaining that the it is not addressed by the basic issue implicated by the first certified question. The district court remains free to submit an additional certified question on that point under Rule 18. *3.
The second certified question, as rephrased, is whether Alabama’s shield statute protects “any and all information” that could reasonably lead to the identification of a source whose identity is protected from compelled disclosure. *4. The Court emphasizes that, by its plain language, § 12-21-142 does not protect “any and all information” that could lead to the discovery of the identity of a confidential source, because information that could lead to that discovery will not necessarily do so. (Emphasis added). *6. Therefore, interpreting § 12-21-142 as broadly as the Times does would risk creating protection for information that the statute, on its face, does not protect. *6.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on two additional principles. First, because the reporter’s privilege modifies the common law, it must be narrowly construed, and the party invoking it bears the burden of showing that disclosure of the specific information at issue would inevitably reveal a confidential source’s identity – a fact intensive question committed to the circuit court. *5. Second, the Court surveyed shield statutes in other states that expressly extend protection to information that would “substantially increase the likelihood” of, or “could reasonably be expected to lead to,” or “tend to” reveal a source’s identity, reasoning that the Alabama Legislature’s choice not to adopt comparably broad language confirmed that § 12-21-142 protects only inevitable, not merely possible, revelation. *6.
Thus, construed strictly and narrowly, that language protects only information that would inevitably reveal the identity of a confidential source, not “any and all information” that “could reasonably lead” to the discovery of the identity of the source. (Emphasis added). *6. The Court further reasons its holding is one that most narrowly intrudes upon the common law and is the only holding that it can without question say does not go beyond the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the language of § 12-21-142. *8.
Accordingly, the Court answers the second certified question in the negative, holding that Alabama’s reporter privilege extends only to information that would inevitably reveal the identity of a confidential source, not to all information that could reasonably lead to that information. *8.