In Ex parte Spencer, 2026 WL 1356293 (May 15, 2026), the Court (Bryan, J.; Stewart, C.J., concurring; Shaw, J., concurring specially, with opinion; Cook, J., concurring specially, with opinion; Parker, J., concurring in the result, with opinion, Sellers, J., dissenting, with opinion; Mendheim, J., dissenting, with opinion to which Wise, J., joins) reverses the Court of Criminal Appeals judgment affirming Spencer’s sentencing of life without the possibility of parole and remands for resentencing, concluding that the trial court must re-sentence with the understanding that there is discretion expressly afforded by §13A-5-9(c)(3) when the Habitual Felony Offender Act (HFOA) applies.
Spencer was convicted of pharmacy robbery and first-degree robbery. *1. Under §13A-5-9, Ala. Code 1975, the HFOA allows discretion to sentence with the possibility of parole. Under §13A-8-52(a), Ala. Code 1975, the Pharmacy Robbery Act does not allow for parole. Id. On de novo review, the Court finds that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in its hybrid application of both the HFOA and §13A-8-52(a) of the Pharmacy Robbery Act, which led to its conclusion that the circuit court was required to sentence Spencer to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole despite the HFOA’s explicit delegation of discretion to the circuit court. Id. While the State asks the Court to construe §13A-8-52(a) as restricting the discretion explicitly afforded in the HFOA, the Court refuses, holding that the HFOA plainly affords the discretion to sentence with the possibility of parole and noting that “[a] court may construe a statute only ‘[i]f the language of a statute is not “plain” or is ambiguous.’” Id. at *4.