Ex parte 3M Co., Inc., No. SC-2025-0521, 2026 WL 1110601 (Ala. Apr. 24, 2026). The Court (Shaw, J., Stewart, C.J., and Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, McCool, and Parker, JJ., concur; Cook, J., recuses) grants the petition for writ of prohibition, holding federal courts retain jurisdiction of cases removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442 and claims against federal officers or agencies when the remand order is properly appealed.
In July 2024, the Town of Pine Hill (“the Town”) sued Defendants, alleging defendants contaminated their water supply by way of chemicals released into the Alabama River. Id. at *1. The Town sought compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief. The Town raised no federal claim but sued foreign corporations whose employees were Alabama residents. 3M Company, Inc. filed a notice of removal from Wilcox County Circuit Court to the United States District Court of the Southern District of Alabama, Northern Division citing the federal-officer removal statute (see 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)) and diversity jurisdiction. Id. On March 6, 2025, the federal district court remanded the case back to the circuit court. Id. The parties received notice of remand via email on March 7, 2025, and 3M filed a notice of appeal that same day. Id.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 62, the remand order was automatically stayed for 30 days upon 3M’s notice of appeal. The federal court’s order stayed “execution of the remand order . . . until the appeal is complete.” Id. at *2. The Town filed a brief in Wilcox County Circuit Court arguing the circuit court had jurisdiction once the remand order was filed. 3M disagreed, maintaining the federal court retained jurisdiction during the stay and pendency of the appeal. On June 9, 2025, the circuit court entered an order concluding that it had regained jurisdiction over the case “immediately” upon the federal district court’s remand and that, because the issues on appeal “[were] not dispositive in nature,” it was “in the interest of justice and judicial economy for the parties to commence the litigation process while awaiting the decision of the Eleventh Circuit.” Id.
On June 24, 2025, 3M filed a motion requesting that the federal court vacate its remand order and clarify that it maintained jurisdiction until the appeal was complete, and 3M thereafter filed the writ of prohibition to direct the circuit court to vacate its June 9, 2025 order. Id. “Prohibition is proper for the prevention of a usurpation or abuse of power where a court undertakes to act in a manner in which it does not properly have jurisdiction.” Ex parte K.S.G., 645 So. 2d 287, 299 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992).
The Court notes that where a case is removed under § 1442, an order remanding to state court “shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). See Plaquemines Parish v. Chevron USA, Inc., 84 F.4th 362 (5th Cir. 2023) (holding federal courts have jurisdiction to stay a remand following mail of a certified copy of the order to the circuit court when a case is removed under § 1442). Id. at *5. See also First Union Nat'l Bank of Fla. v. Hall, 123 F.3d 1374, 1377 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Section 1447(d) ... applies only to cases remanded, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or defects in the removal procedure. ... Remand orders issued on other grounds are fully reviewable, and the district court is free to reconsider those remand orders.”). Id.
Therefore, the Court holds that, despite issuance of the remand order, the federal court retained jurisdiction over its order remanding the case, given that that the case was removed under the federal-officer removal statute. Id. at *6. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), the remand order is treated like any other final judgment, and the federal district court retained jurisdiction to either stay or vacate its remand order following issuance. The circuit court did not have jurisdiction to require defendants to resume litigation while the issue of removal remained pending on appeal. Id.