Ex parte Corey Wallace, SC-2026-0278, CV-24-900471 (Ala. Oct. 2, 2026). The Supreme Court (Stewart, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Cook, and McCool, JJ., concur; Mendheim, J., concurs in part and in the result, with opinion; Parker, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result, with opinion, which Sellers, J., joins) grants the petition for writ of mandamus.
In May 2022, Corrections Officer Corey Wallace served as the lone rover and command center operator for F Dorm at Staton Correctional Facility due to understaffing. *1. Wallace announced mealtime and the inmates exited their respective cells. Inmate Antavis Thornton was attacked and stabbed by two inmates. *2. Thornton sued Wallace alleging Wallace allowed his attackers to enter his cell by inadequately patrolling and failing to check the armbands of the inmates entering F Dorm. *2. Wallace filed for summary judgment claiming State-agent immunity pursuant to Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000), which Thornton opposed arguing a recognized exception to Cranman immunity, that Wallace acted beyond his authority by failing to follow the standard operating procedures (SOP) checklist (See Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1053 (Ala. 2003)) and that “Wallace had been deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to Thornton,” violating Thornton’s Eighth Amendment rights. *3. Wallace responded the SOPs were “not ‘so specific’ that they removed all discretion” and that Thornton failed to show Wallace had knowledge of the safety risk. *3. The circuit court denied Wallace’s summary judgment motion, and Wallace filed his petition thereafter. *3.
The Supreme Court holds the SOPs were not sufficiently detailed to meet the “beyond authority” exception to Cranman,and Thornton failed to present substantial evidence that Wallace’s conduct violated procedure. *7. See Ex parte Ingram, 229 So. 3d 220, 229 (Ala. 2017) (the exception is inapplicable when the “relevant guideline leaves room for the exercise of any discretion or professional judgment by the employee in relation to the particular circumstances with which the employee may be presented.”).
In a matter of first impression, the Court considers whether a State-agent enjoys immunity for an alleged Eighth Amendment violation. *9. While compliance with the Eighth Amendment does require prison officials to act to guarantee the safety of inmates (See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)), “[i]t is a prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate who suffers injury’ that give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation.” Lane v. Philbin, 835 F. 3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2016). A plaintiff must show substantial evidence of a substantial risk of harm coupled with deliberate indifference thereto by the State-agent, and causation. Marbury v. Warden III, 180 F. 4th 1349m, 1356 (11th Cir. 2026).
The Court does not determine whether Thornton showed the requisite evidence of a substantial risk of harm but assumes arguendo that he had. *10. An officer “acts with deliberate indifference when the officer ‘knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” *11; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Deliberate indifference has a subjective and objective component. See Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F. 3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014). The Court also assumes arguendo that Thornton met the subjective component (actual knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm). Caldwell, 748 F. 3d at 1099. The Court determines Thornton failed to show substantial evidence Wallace knew of ways to reduce a strong likelihood of harm but knowingly or recklessly declined to act. *11. Importantly, the defendant “cannot be deliberately indifferent to an excessive risk of inmate violence unless he or she had the capability – that is, the means – to provide adequate security and did not do so.” See LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F. 2d 1526, 1536 (11th Cir. 1993). Wallace was the only officer on duty and performing multiple roles at the time of the incident. *12. The Court holds Thornton failed to meet the objective component. *13. There is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Wallace violated the Eighth Amendment, and Wallace is therefore entitled to State-agent immunity. *13.
Justice Mendheim agrees that Wallace did not act beyond his authority but does not agree with the Court’s reasoning regarding the Eighth Amendment violation. *13.
Justice Parker and Justice Sellers agree that Wallace is entitled to State-agent immunity and that the SOPS were not specific enough to remove discretion. They find it unnecessary to reach the objective component. In their view, there is no genuine issue of material fact because Thornton failed to present substantial evidence the officer knew “his own conduct – again, his own actions or inactions – put the [inmate] at substantial risk at harm.” See Wade v. McDade, 106 F. 4th 1251, 1258 (11th Cir. 2024). *13.