Personnel Bd. of Jefferson County v. City of Trussville, [Ms. SC-2024-0298, Sept. 12, 2025] __ So. 3d __ (Ala. 2025). In a per curiam opinion, the Court (Bryan, McCool, and Lewis, JJ., concur; Stewart, C.J., concurs specially, with opinion, which Mendheim, J., joins; Shaw, J., concurs in the result, with opinion; Wise, J., dissents; Sellers and Cook, JJ., dissent, with opinions) reverses the Jefferson Circuit Court’s order holding that the Jefferson County Personnel Board (“the Board”) lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of Act No. 2023-460, Ala. Acts 2023, which permits municipalities that meet certain requirements to opt out of the jurisdiction of their county’s personnel board. Pursuant to the Act, the City of Trussville (“the City”) opted out of the Board’s jurisdiction.
The Court concludes the Board has standing to challenge the legality of the Act under either of the tests for standing applied by the Court. The Court explains:
Instead of requiring a concrete injury to a legally protected right as the test derived from Lujan [Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)], does, the test in [Express Enterprises, Inc. v.] Waites, [979 So. 2d 754 (Ala. 2007)] requires a litigant to be within the circle of persons or entities protected by the statute being challenged. The Lujan and Waites tests, then, despite surface-level similarities, differ in focus: Lujan concentrates on the nature of the injury allegedly sustained by the plaintiff, while Waites considers first who is protected by the challenged statute. We recognize that the Waites test may be better suited for analyzing some situations. But our precedent has made it clear that our default test for determining standing is the test derived from Lujan. See Town of Cedar Bluff v. Citizens Caring for Children, 904 So. 2d 1253, 1256-57 (Ala. 2004). Consequently, it was incumbent upon the trial court to explain why it applied the Waites test instead of the test derived from Lujan. But the trial court provided no such explanation. Regardless, the Board has the requisite standing to bring this action under either test.
Ms. **8-9.
“Applying the Waites test that the trial court relied on, the Board has standing because it is squarely within the group affected by the Act.” Ms. *9. As to standing under the Lujan test, the loss of jurisdiction, a legally protected right, “alone is sufficient to establish such an injury… Even if it were not, the imminent loss of $300,000 annually satisfies any fair-minded definition of an ‘actual, concrete and particularized injury.’” Ms. *11.
The Court also rejects the trial court’s alternative ground for dismissal that passage of the Act complied with constitutional requirements. The Court first explains “[t]he Act appears to fall under the third category of general laws set forth in [Alabama Citizens Action Program v. Kennamer, 479 So. 2d 1237, 1242- 43 (Ala. 1985)]. It neither applies to the whole state nor to municipalities of a class where the class is defined by the law’s purpose. See § 11-43-5.2. Instead, it applies to a subset of Class 8 municipalities – one of the ‘eight classes of municipalities based on population’ that the Legislature created after the ratification of § 110. See id.; see also § 11- 40-12 et seq., Ala. Code 1975.” Ms. *17. The Court holds that the trial court must conduct further fact finding to determine the constitutionality of the Act because
§ 110 [Ala. Const. 1901], in addition to defining a general law, stipulates that “[n]o general law which at the time of its enactment applies to only one municipality of the state shall be enacted, unless notice of the intention to apply therefor shall have been given and shown as provided in Section 106.” (Emphasis added.) In its complaint, the Board alleged that the City was the only municipality of the State that met the Act’s requirements at the time of its enactment; thus, the Act may be a rare example of a general law that is subject to the requirements of § 106. It is undisputed that the Legislature did not comply with the notice requirements contained in § 106; therefore, if the allegations contained in the Board’s complaint are true, the Legislature enacted the Act in a manner inconsistent with § 110’s plain text.
Ms. **17-18.