Glasscock v. Glasscock, [Ms. SC-2025-0196, Aug. 22, 2025] __ So. 3d __ (Ala. 2025). The Court (Lewis, J.; Stewart, C.J., and Wise, Sellers, and Cook, JJ., concur) reverses the Morgan Circuit Court’s summary judgment dismissing Truman Glasscock III’s (“Truman III”) unjust enrichment, conversion, and fraud claims against Theresa Glasscock regarding her withdrawal of funds in various bank accounts. Truman III alleged that despite not being an owner or signatory on the accounts, Theresa withdrew several hundred thousand dollars from accounts owned by her husband, Truman Glasscock, Jr., shortly before Truman, Jr.’s death and while he was in a coma. Ms. **2-3.
The circuit court concluded that as a payable-on-death beneficiary on the accounts, Truman III lacked “standing” to assert claims against Theresa for withdrawing the funds. Ms. *4.
The Court reverses, holding
Section 5-24-12(b)(2), Ala. Code 1975, provides that, when an account holds a payable-on-death designation, “[o]n the death of the sole party or the last survivor of two or more parties, sums on deposit belong to the surviving beneficiary or beneficiaries.” Here, it is undisputed that Truman Jr. was the only named party on the RFCU account, but Truman III was designated as the payable-on-death beneficiary. Pursuant to § 5-24-12(b)(2), Truman III became the sole owner of the RFCU account upon the death of Truman Jr. on September 13, 2021. Because Truman III’s interest had vested by the time of filing his initial complaint on September 15, 2022, Truman III was the proper party to bring suit against Theresa for wrongful acts alleged to have been committed against Truman Jr. See Ex parte McKinney, 87 So. 3d 502, 510 (Ala. 2011) (recognizing that “[s]tanding is the requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation” (citations omitted)). For this Court to hold otherwise would “effectively insulate a[n alleged] wrongdoer’s bad act.” Ex parte Estelle, 982 So. 2d 1086, 1090 (Ala. 2007).
Ms. **7-8.
Citing Ex parte BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 159 So. 3d 31 (Ala. 2013), the Court explains “even if Truman III fails to meet the elements of the claims brought against Theresa, he would have a failure to prove one’s cause of action problem, not a standing problem, and the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear such [failure-of-proof] problems.” Ms. **9-10, internal quotation marks and brackets omitted.