Officer Enjoys State-agent Immunity for Discretionary Actions Performed While on Routine Patrol

|

Ex parte Alonzo Cornelius Coleman IV and The City of Birmingham, SC-2025-0482, CV-22-901929 (Ala. Oct. 16, 2026). The Supreme Court (Bryan, J., and McCool concurs; Cook, J. concurs in part and concurs in the result, with opinion, which Wise and Parker, JJ., join; Shaw and Sellers, JJ., concur in the result; Mendheim, J., dissents, with opinion, which Stewart, C.J., joins) grants the petition for writ of mandamus, holding Officer Coleman and the City of Birmingham are immune from suit because Officer Coleman was on routine patrol and performing a discretionary function at the time of the crash.

On January 15, 2022, Birmingham Police Department Officer Alonzo Coleman was on routine patrol in his patrol vehicle when he struck and killed pedestrian Ricardo Morales. *1. It was raining, and Officer Coleman was listening to a podcast on his personal cell phone at the time of the crash. There is conflicting evidence regarding whether Officer Coleman was speeding. Mr. Morales’ brother sued Officer Coleman in his official and individual capacities and the City of Birmingham for wrongful death. Officer Coleman and the City moved for summary judgment on immunity grounds. The circuit court denied the motions, finding that Officer Coleman was not entitled to State-agent immunity on the individual-capacity claim. Both Coleman and the City filed a petition for writ of mandamus.

A law enforcement officer on routine patrol is engaged in a discretionary law enforcement function protected by State-agent immunity pursuant to the fourth category of Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000), as modified by Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300 (Ala. 2006). The Court holds “the act of patrolling naturally involves the exercise of an officer’s judgment and discretion” and requires “more than the everyday conduct of driving a motor vehicle.” *4. The Court is not persuaded that Officer Coleman acted beyond his authority by listening to a podcast on his cell phone. The Court concludes there was substantial evidence that Officer Coleman was speeding, but holds his speed did not constitute action beyond his authority that would deprive him of State-agent immunity. *8. Because Office Coleman is immune, the City is also immune and entitled to summary judgment. *9. See City of Bayou La Batre v. Robinson, 785 So 2d 1128, 1131 (Ala. 2000).

Related Document

Categories: 
Share To: